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Prof. Amir has written a rich, complex and searching book with a vast scholarly 
range that defies the poor reviewer. I shall confine myself to an overview of the main 
theory, the worldview homo risibilis, as well as a few of the claims she makes about its 
promise. I have some questions too about the dialectical logic by which we are to obtain 
the promised relief. I end with a brief discussion of a Theravada Buddhism perspective 
on desire and compassion, an alleged rival to Amir’s theory, and ask how well it fits into 
Amir’s typology of opposing solutions. 
A worldview is a theory of the human condition. As such, homo risibilis strives to be 
a “traditional philosophy”, setting itself in competition with world religions and other 
world-historic philosophies. Prof. Amir’s ambition is not so much to frame a correct theory 
of humor, but to apply what she takes to be a correct theory of humor (she focuses on a 
self-referential version of the incongruity theory) to an understanding of the human 
condition. Among the advantages she touts of her theory are its minimalist epistemic and 
metaphysical commitments, which set it above its idealist and religious rivals. Moreover, 
in the book’s final two chapters, a case is laid out for a suite of personal and social benefits 
of the worldview. In particular, an egalitarian ethics of compassion is arrived at (though at 
times it seems to need to be as much an input as an outcome). Though I speak here of a 
theory of the human condition, we are clearly not dealing with any straightforwardly 
verifiable empirical theory that stands or falls with consensus evidence. The proof of 
homo risibilis, if it is to have one, will be shown by its fitness in our lives, by its use to 
readers in coping with, and reconciling with (what in technical language is known as) the 
shit that happens. Indeed, Amir sets the bar high, hoping to rival world religions and once 
“mighty philosophies”.  
The starting point of Amir’s thinking is the ridiculousness of the human situation. In 
many respects this is similar to the notoriously alleged absurdity of human existence, and 
certainly it reflects an alienation that is endemic to society and transcultural in complexion. 
The realization of absurdity might tempt one to despair; but just as we are told Sisyphus 
must be happy, so, in Amir’s view, we must imagine him laughing. (Or better, through 
laughter reconciling to his ridiculous fate.) Indeed, Amir “never loses sight of the tragic 
overtones”, and does not seek to transcend or eliminate the root tragic tension. Instead she 
wants to provide what “helps us live with unresolved tension” (p. x), since “living with 
unresolved tension of our situation is required to preserve our humanity” (p. xi). Though 
the equivocation is inhumane, one may wonder whether preserving our humanity is worth 
all the trouble, since we begin with so little of it.  
Prof. Amir develops the homo risibilis vision, first by contrasting it with tragic 
visions of the human condition. This is done in a masterful survey spanning millennia of 
philosophy, the first of many such surveys that give the book its astonishing richness. 
This first discussion culminates in a particular framing of the problem as a conflict, in 
principle or practice, between desires in general and reason, which perceives their 
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ultimate futility.  
The exact “formula proposed” to articulate the bind we find ourselves is quoted 
verbatim below. It is, according to Amir, importantly “validated further by its implicit 
intimations in the fundamentals of most religions and philosophies, both Eastern and 
Western” (p. 41).  Although Amir’s precise “formula” setting out the essential human 
tension as a conflict between reason and desire is significant enough to be repeated 
elsewhere in the book, it is not strictly clung to. For instance, Amir sometimes writes, not 
of a conflict between desire and reason, but of conflict in the very nature of desire itself. 
Thus at one point she concludes “that contradictions are inherent to desires” (p. 46). Is the 
problem desire; or is the problem a conflict between desire and reason? To some this may 
seem like a terminological point, but it seems prudent to begin with a correct analysis of 
the fundamental problem. The issue, related to how successfully Amir’s homo risibilis 
can rival other philosophies, arises again below, where I address her general conception 
of desire. 
In any case, the conflict so formulated is used to set up another contrast, namely 
amongst types of solutions to the fundamental problem. We have those that renounce 
desire; those that denigrate reason; and those that dump on both. All three of these 
approaches are found wanting. The only remaining possibility, in Amir’s argument, is 
“abstaining from resolving the problem”:  
“Since our humanity seems to depend on a precarious balance 
between our desires and our reason, leaving it unresolved may 
be the better course of action when solutions require negating 
one or the other, or both.” (p. 56) 
So instead of resolving the tragic tension she finds to be ineradicable from human 
nature, the power of humor is invoked as a way “to ease somewhat this tension” (p. xi). 
One begins to see my difficulty: if the tragic tension is better conceived as a problem within 
desire (rather than between desire and reason), then not only is Amir’s typology of 
solutions cast in doubt; but also the arguments founded upon it — notably the alleged costs 
of alternative solutions —  appear to shudder, and not with laughter.  
 Far more importantly, one feels the goal posts shifting.  
Let me explain. We are told that, due to too high a human cost, we must put up with 
a tension that other traditional philosophies and world religions promise to resolve. Now 
even if humor is successful in lightening our load, can we really say that Amir’s attempt 
rivals those that still aim to resolve it?  Has the bar not suddenly lowered? (Or is that the 
boom?) If, for comparison, we were led to hope that we may overcome suffering, and then 
discover that in fact we may only moderate it, we may be glad of progress. But, when told 
to make do, are we still vying for the original goal?  Have we not abandoned it?  One 
might even reach the reduced goal of better adjustment without getting effectively any 
closer to the original promise. Rivals must play at the same game.  
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What if, instead humor, were a friend to them all, and rival to none?  This much is 
clear: the power of humor to help us bear our burdens is comprehensively supported in 
Amir’s book. In that respect, this reviewer finds little to dispute and much to celebrate. If 
the tragic character of our essential human tension is prodigiously documented by Amir, so 
is the power of humor to “transmute the tragic into the comic”. Amir understands humor to 
be a “multidimensional construct involving simultaneously cognitive, emotive and 
conative or motivational components”. Working through “‘bisociation’ or constant 
incongruity” (p. 104), humor “enables the simultaneous perception of multiple points of 
view” (p. 84), including contradictory ones. Thus it is a conceptual tool that can handle 
contradictions. Humor works emotionally in part by “reduc[ing] desire and impeding 
action”; plus “it reduces our intolerance of ambivalence” (p. 84). It can lower “shame and 
disgust” and leave us “more at ease when dealing with reality” (p. 85).  Humor also 
possesses the power to “encourage self-acceptance and tolerance of others” (p. 86). 
Chapter 4 deals with a number of philosophical benefits of humor, starting with 
self-knowledge but proceeding to improved deliberation and positive self-change. Humor 
is lauded for “its permissiveness, its tolerant and reflective character” (p. 73). 
The obvious objection to this boosterism (fair as far as it goes) is that humor may 
just as easily be put to opposite non-constructive uses. Doesn’t humor, for its effects to be 
humane, require an ethics of compassion, rather than deliver one?  One way Amir 
counteracts this objection is to lay emphasis on self-directed humor (which scorners deny 
even exists). Self-directed humor “encourages self-acceptance, tolerance ‘of self and 
others’ and a sense of identification with humanity’” (Amir quoting Dziemidok). But 
evidently self-directed humor would be especially relevant to conflicts within the self. 
Humor is able to grasp both inner and social conflict as exactly the sort of incongruity that 
feeds it. Regarding inner conflict, Amir writes: 
“Once an intrapersonal conflict is construed as an incongruity, humor is 
able to bring about recognition of the conflict and knowledge of its 
components, which then allows an individual to either live consciously 
with unresolved conflict or facilitate its resolution.” (p. 83) 
And again: 
“Intrapersonal conflict calls for self-directed or self-referential humor. 
…. Self-referential humor is a moderator of extreme emotions, a 
proponent of sympathy or empathy, a conceptual tool for holding 
contradictions and a form of intrapersonal communication that is 
conducive to philosophic self-education.” (p. 81) 
We see here how humor could conceivably be deployed systematically to reduce all 
manner of inner or intrapersonal conflict; and indeed, much the same applies to social or 
interpersonal conflicts, which have their roots in individual minds. But now watch. If we 
regard the human predicament as pervasively riddled with tragic conflict, then we can set 
humor to work at large. In this way homo risibilis, a worldview that regards the human 
condition as inevitably in conflict, also provides the conceptual, emotional and 
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motivational wherewithal to transform tragic conflict to comic incongruity, and set to 
work … laughing. Thus even though, cosmically speaking, we are “the butt of an 
anonymous joke” (p. 238), by adopting homo risibilis we “can transmute suffering into a 
serenity and joy that rivals the highest philosophical and religious ideals.” For, the homo 
risibilis vision “construes tragic tensions as comic incongruities.” We have to imagine 
Sisyphus laughing. 
Of course the joke wears off. The effect of humor is transient. Says Amir: “The 
outcomes of self-referential laughter as defined until now do not last” (p. 120). This 
presents a snag for a proposed solution to a perennial problem. Amir’s response, the heart 
of the important Chapter 5 of her book, is dialectical. Roughly, humor must keep at it, since 
its effects wear off. But bisociation is creative, and can keep coming up with humorous 
jokes or other new material. “[T]he very repetition that a humorous mood requires in order 
to reduce the tension defining the human condition is itself a higher form of the comical.” 
(p. 119). 
Thus repetition is required but “repetition itself is comical”. Instead of increasing the 
ridiculousness of our position, however, this move dissolves it. “The humorous mood 
obtained through transposing tragic oppositions into comical incongruities is transitory” 
(p.  121); but when the mood dissipates, our ambivalence at having to repeat it is, and 
“remains the bread of comedy”. Our amusement is now “a higher level of comic 
awareness” (p. 122) in that it allows for a transcending of the tragical and the comical at 
once. In this way, the vision of homo risibilis, and our comic ridiculousness itself, can be 
dispensed with: “Like the Buddhist’s raft, the Taoist fisherman’s net and Wittgenstein’s 
ladder, we can dispose of “the ridiculous human being” vision when its benefits are reaped 
even more easily than these mighty philosophies can get rid of their instruments of 
deliverance” (p. ix; see also pp. 138, 235). It is this dialectical move that I should like to 
problematize. 
I have assumed the infinity productivity of humor to respond ever new to the same 
old eternal shit-bind we are in. One can question that assumption. But even if humor is 
infinite, all I have is my own sense of humor, which friends and students know has its 
limits. And if I didn’t have even that, and was - as so many people are- humourless; or if 
my humor is not working for me just now, when I most need it; then how does Prof. Amir’s 
worldview help me?  How can I laugh at myself if (even mistakably) I don’t think I am 
funny (or laughable)? In a way, I am all the more laughable for even asking that (as Amir 
notes), but that doesn’t help me while I can’t see it. Unless perhaps the laughter of another 
could still liberate me.  
The problem is: Does everyone have a funny bone?  Does Amir’s solution work 
only for those who are already humorous, and who can sustain humor in the face of 
calamaty?  Prof. Amir admits and addresses this problem. She states that “a tragic 
incongruity cannot always be perceived as comical by the person while she is experiencing 
it”. Yet (basing herself on a noted kinship between tragedy and comedy, and various other 
observations) she nevertheless avers the following: “I believe that most intrapersonal tragic 
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conflicts have the potential to transform themselves into comical incongruities” (p. 76. My 
italics.) 
I was relieved here to learn that the conflicts will “transform themselves”, since the 
Sisyphean work of comedy is exhausting, and I could use the help. But on closer 
examination we see that only the potential to do so is literally asserted here. The mere 
potential for transformation, when one might have expected assurances of effectiveness, 
casts doubt on Amir’s claims to rival (at least the very best of) what some traditional world 
philosophies offer. I want to suggest that she has a solution without a method, for there is 
no recipe for converting tragic conflicts into humorous incongruities, nor any way to 
generate the necessary sense of humor in someone in dire straits and in dire need of one. 
Granting the insight of homo risibilis, it advances no yoga. (In fairness, the book never set 
out to deliver exercises or a routine by which one might develop and make use of humor 
in life; in fact, it would be well complemented by a practical workbook in future outlining 
a “yoga” or discipline of humor.) 
I want now to return to the beginning, and look closely at the “proposed formula” 
with which Amir articulates the essential human tension. Amir takes the human condition 
to be:   
“defined by a tension between one’s desires on all levels, 
instinctual, emotional, moral, intellectual and spiritual, and the 
(im)possibility of fulfilling them either in principle in practice, 
brought to us by reason.” (p. 28; see also p. 41 and p. 236) 
The difficulty I have with this framing is not the simple misunderstanding that opposes 
rational reason and irrational desires; Amir considers the idea and rightly puts it aside (p. 
46). We can and do sometimes talk as if reason had its own desire and desire its reason. 
But to set desires “on all levels” (including intellectual) over against reason, cast as the 
bearer of bad news, makes this opposition lopsided and incoherent. The tension so 
formulated seems to slip away. Plato regarded all but just philosophical souls to be in 
turmoil, with desire squared off against reason, which was allied with shame, anger, and a 
painful concern for one’s own reputation. Hume re-analyzed this messy threesome and 
claimed that reason had no part in the fray, that one desire was pitted against another. Now 
Amir nicely remarks (p. 47) that she does not know whether reason is the ruler or slave of 
passion, but that normative question is quite another matter. While she may thus neatly 
sidestep the question as to the role reason ought to play in the psychic economy, she can’t 
very well plead indifference as to whether the fundamental human predicament is a clash 
amongst desires, or one between reason and desire. As I said, one can certainly speak of the 
desires of reason, or of reasonable desires. But if reason is not to be just one among so 
many desires, with grounds irreducible to our own satisfaction, we ought to make clear 
whether we are dealing most fundamentally with a conflict amongst desires — perhaps 
already inherent in the nature of desire — or with a conflict between the nature of desire 
and that of reason.  
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One may think that this is a mere quibble, a choice of terminology. To that extent, 
however, the disjunctive syllogism against her rivals becomes merely verbal. To be sure, 
one must allow that the words can indeed be used in different ways; and that some 
looseness of phraseology allows the “formula proposed” a certain neutrality across 
competing worldviews. But though the appearance of neutrality is thereby enabled, that 
only frustrates its verification. In many communicative contexts that may be just fine; 
(indeed, I exploit that appearance of neutrality routinely in life and in lectures). But 
looseness and neutrality obscure the logic of the opposition, and the dialectical synthesis 
withers. Indeed, at some points, Amir herself seems to lose sight of the reason-desire 
tension, and to frame her quasi-resolution as a reconceptualization of desire itself. Thus in 
a fascinating remark, she writes:  
“My own position may be considered as offering direction from the 
experience of desire as lack to the possibility of experiencing desire, even 
an unfulfilled one, as enjoyment or delight” (p. 46) 
Note there is no actual mention of reason here, only old and new experience. Perhaps 
reason’s role is to change its interpretation, its news; it now brings us the possibility of 
satisfaction and delight, instead of their impossibility.  But then it is reason that has 
changed, reason that was in error, reason that was the problem. But reason is not mentioned 
here at all, though the experience of desire transforms. So it seems in the end rather to be 
desire that must change if our tension would lessen; desire is the problem, not any 
reason-desire conflict.  
Now there is something miraculous indeed if desire as lack could simply be 
re-experienced, or even reinterpreted, as “enjoyment or delight”. Imagine if the pain of 
unrequited love could somehow just be re-experienced as delight, and suffering as 
enjoyment. We would do more than merely “ease somewhat the tension”; we would once 
again rival the highest aims of the great traditional philosophies. So perhaps this is a more 
promising path. But I doubt it. I think more will be required than interpretation, more than 
reason itself, to convert each lack into a delight, and every absence of the beloved object 
into its enjoyment. For that, not logic, but magic alone will suffice. 
The worry I have about the formulated opposition between reason and desire “at all 
levels” goes deeper than the mismatch of generality. Is it even a clear idea — “desire at all 
levels”?  At that extreme level of generality, is there still coherence?  Surely Wittgenstein 
has taught us that not everything by the same name is the same kind. And yet we read the 
following in Amir, explain how she came to her general conception of desire: 
“It comes as no surprise, then, that the terminology used in various 
discussions on desire is not fixed.  ... This dialogue of the deaf, ... 
led me, while attempting a synthesis, to use “desire” in the most 
encompassing way. Thus, to account for this variety while avoiding 
ontological determinations, I understand by desire all the efforts of 
human nature designated by such words as appetites, needs, drives, 
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impulsions, wishes, hopes, etc. It follows that contradictions are 
intrinsic to desires.” (p. 45) 
Notice that the contradictory nature of desire follows directly from the definition of 
desire. Reason has nothing to do with it. But vagueness is no synthesis. Far from avoiding 
them, generality includes the subsumed ontological determinations. As intimated above, 
this impossibly broad” definition” casts Amir threefold typology of solutions into doubt, 
while yet giving us no aid in analyzing the problem of desire, whose contradictions may be 
our tragic tension. And there are more serious consequences as well, primarily whether 
homo risibilis, in ameliorating our tensions, can still claim “to reach the highest promises 
of philosophy and religion, of the East and West”.  
  To illustrate the problem consider Theravada Buddhism. When discussing 
Buddhism, Amir appears to be thinking mostly of later developments within Mahayana. 
With regard to Theravada Buddhism, however, one may even complain of 
misrepresentation. In fact there are reasons to doubt that Amir’s “formula” really is 
“implicit[ly] intimat[ed] in the fundamentals” of the religion.  
  While one can certainly discern a broad resemblance to the Buddha’s teaching 
in Amir’s formulation of the human predicament, the parallels soon fall apart. Amir’s 
tragic starting point corresponds well enough to the Buddha’s First Noble Truth, which is 
the universality of dukkha, often translated as suffering, but fittingly also as 
“unsatisfactoriness”, as if life were “out of joint” (like an injured shoulder) or 
“dysfunctional” (like a broken axle — life rides rough). Amir summarizes her description 
of the human predicament as “dissatisfaction” (p.4 1); dukkha is clearly a lack, rather than 
a delight. The fit appears appears to remain fairly close when we come to the Buddha’s 
Second Noble Truth. Though Amir discerns the essential human tension between desire 
and reason, the Buddha assigns the cause of human misery directly to tanhā, which indeed 
has often been translated as desire. 
 That translation, however, badly distorts the Buddha’s insight, as becomes crystal 
clear when we learn in the Third Noble Truth that the cure for the dis-ease of dukkha is the 
eradication of tanhā. Thus Amir classifies Buddhism as among those world religions that 
teach us to renounce our desires (lack or delight). However, if we use the term desire in 
Amir’s broad and even unwieldy sense, that conclusion is quite misleading. Buddhism 
does not teach that liberation requires you to renounce and eradicate all your “emotional, 
moral, intellectual and spiritual” desires. To renounce intellectual and spiritual desires for 
the sake of knowing the truth and spiritual development must be considered an outright 
impossibility. That said, intellectual and spiritual desires are not perfectly innocent, either. 
So, to understand desire in the comprehensive way Amir does badly distorts the Buddhist 
understanding of the problem, and misconstrues its solutions. 
One does a little better by using the words “craving” or “clinging” to translate tanhā, 
for then it is only craving or clinging which must be got rid of, not “desires at all levels” 
(to use Amir’s phrase). But is there no earnest yearning?  Better still, one might translate 
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tanhā with the more complete phrase “desire-based-in-self”. Then the Buddhist formula 
for overcoming the tragedy of existence is to eliminate desire-based-in-self, not desire tout 
cour. Intellectual and spiritual desires based in self, which the Buddha denounces as 
“attachment to views”, are recognized as a major source of our problems, but not 
intellectual or spiritual desire as such. Non-self-regarding desires, such as wishes for other 
people’s benefit, desire to understand, and the determination to eradicate 
desire-based-in-self, need not be harmful at all; they may even be perfected into the 
spiritual virtues like wisdom and compassion. In other words, it is the entanglements of self 
that bring about suffering, according to Buddhism. The problem indeed is not so much 
desire as what or how we desire. And it is not because, as Amir suggests, we cannot in 
practice or principle fulfill desires. Fulfilled desires-based-in-self are no less out-of-joint, 
dysfunctional, and unsatisfactory than unfulfilled ones. Desire fulfilled is also suffering, 
according to the Buddha. If reason perceives this flaw, it does not thereby become part of 
the problem; and really it is just calm awareness that perceives the problem, not any chain 
of reasoning. Nor is reason really part of the solution, which does not consists in a 
compelling argument, or a persuasive rationale, but a discipline of volition (i.e., a yoga). 
These considerations cast quite a different light on Amir’s advice, which perhaps 
makes the humor solution seem more complete than perhaps it is. She writes:  
“we should also be wary of solutions that urge us to renounce our 
desires, lest we be dehumanized by a solution that purports to do 
away with that which makes us human” (p. 56) 
The backhand critique is that religion, including Buddhism as just outlined, obliterates 
the human in us, which drives its costs too high. But must we preserve humanity just to 
enjoy the joke?  Which cost is too high?  How costly is “desire at all levels”?  Does 
Prof. Amir think, for instance, that “intellectual and spiritual” desires are on the chopping 
block in Buddhist meditation? In any case, it is quite wrong to claim, as she does baldly on 
p. 43), that “Ethical reflection on desire originates in Greek philosophy”. Tacit 
qualifications were no doubt intended, but should not have been left unstated. 
Amir is concerned that the eradication of desires will result in the obliteration of the 
human. At this point, it seems to me, Amir’s argument becomes ideological, since it rests 
on the non-empirical concept of human nature, a well-known political football. Indeed, if 
we insist that she stick in this concern to her impossibly broad definition of desire, the 
claim becomes untenable. Surely not all desires are essential to human kind. So we may 
demand to know which desires are we actually able to do without. And we might even 
decide some desires are worth keeping, without thereby committing ourselves to any 
essentialist claims of human nature. But again, put aside the whole question of human 
nature, a derived notion, and ask what goes to the main: which sorts of desires can humor 
best keep alive, and which laugh out of existence, to be replaced by a delight even their 
satisfaction could not provide?  In this light, a sympathetic Buddhist perspective on 
humor might see it rather as a feature of the smiling teacher’s renowned upāya, or skillful 
means, in teaching. 
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One last question about compassion: is it a necessary input to or an outcome fostered 
by humor?  Amir tabulates it as chief among the ethical benefits of assuming homo 
risibilis, and we may grant here (what remains perhaps disputable) that humor softens the 
heart and strengths compassion. But does humor create compassion, or merely intensify 
it?  And can it not also reduce it? Humor might spread compassion or shrink it. Amir 
covers the positive and negative results of humor that sociology has documented; but 
relies on the positive results to create the sorts of self-change, reduced tension and 
“identification with humanity” that support her case. Yet the negative side of humor also 
shows itself, sometimes in sad and sickly forms, even in self-directed humor. Sometimes 
we laugh at ourselves in all the wrong ways, even unto death. And yet, the necessity of 
some compassion to begin with, lest humor become mean and destructive, is not squarely 
a critique of Amir’s position, any more than the existence of compassionless physicians 
refutes medical science. Perhaps the appearance of critique comes from the harsher 
connotations, impossible to avoid in English, of especially the verb form, to ridicule. Our 
hearts may be defrosted by our own ridiculousness, but when did compassion ever mock 
or ridicule?   
In a final word, that again and perhaps inevitably must seem more critical than it is: 
homo risibilis is not - after all - ridiculous, is not to be ridiculed, taunted or derided. 
Homo risibilis is precisely risible, laughable, able to be roused by laughter, and worthy of 
a send-up.  
 
 
 
 
